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ABSTRACT 
A key issue, whenever people work together to solve a 
complex problem, is how to divide the problem into parts 
done by different people and combine the parts into a 
solution for the whole problem.  This paper presents a novel 
way of doing this with groups of contests called contest 
webs.  Based on the analogy of supply chains for physical 
products, the method provides incentives for people to (a) 
reuse work done by themselves and others, (b) 
simultaneously explore multiple ways of combining 
interchangeable parts, and (c) work on parts of the problem 
where they can contribute the most.   
The paper also describes a field test of this method in an 
online community of over 50,000 people who are 
developing proposals for what to do about global climate 
change. The early results suggest that the method can, 
indeed, work at scale as intended.   
Author Keywords 
Collective intelligence; climate change; contests; contest 
webs; knowledge reuse; coordination; incentives 
ACM Classification Keywords 
Categories and subject descriptors:  H.5.3 [Information 
interfaces and presentation]: Group and organizational 
Interfaces:  Collaborative computing, Computer-supported 
cooperative work, Organizational design, Theory & models.   
General terms:  Design, Economics, Management 
INTRODUCTION 
Whenever people work together to solve any kind of 
problem, the problem must somehow—even if 
unconsciously—be divided into pieces done by different 
people.  And once the problem has been divided, the 
solutions to the different pieces must somehow be 
combined into a solution for the overall problem.  These 
two coordination processes—dividing and combining—are 
done in many different ways in many different situations 
ranging from small workgroups to huge hierarchies to 
global markets. The CSCW community has long been 
interested in these processes, and especially of late in ways 
of creating complex artifacts from simpler components (e.g. 
[14,23–25,28,38]).  
We propose here a novel approach for using online contests 
to carry out these two processes.  Based on the analogy of 
supply webs for physical products, we call this approach 
contest webs. Unlike traditional online contests, a contest 
web includes a family of related contests, some of which 
explicitly involve combining ideas from others. And unlike 
other organizational alternatives such as the hierarchies 
common in businesses and the consensus decision-making 
of Wikipedia, this approach encourages simultaneous 
exploration of many alternative combinations of pieces 
created by different people.  
The principal contribution of the paper is to articulate this 
new approach and to describe the system and the online 
community we developed to implement it.  The online 
community, called Climate CoLab, includes over 50,000 
people who are addressing the complex problem of what to 
do about global climate change.   
We focus, in this paper, on the system design and the 
rationale for that design, leaving detailed evaluation for 
future papers. We do include here, however, some 
empirical results from pilot testing the system in the 
Climate CoLab community.  This pilot testing helped 
answer questions about whether the approach could work at 
all in a large, diverse community.  We focused, in 
particular, on two key questions:  Would people actually 
reuse their own and others’ work as we intended?  And 
would they simultaneously explore multiple combinations 
of interchangeable parts?  After answering these questions, 
the paper reflects on when this approach may be useful and 
how the system we developed might be used for many other 
types of problems in different situations.  
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BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
Coordinating large-scale problem-solving 
Theorists in many different fields have discussed ways of 
dividing and combining parts of complex processes.  For 
example, Adam Smith [41] described the potential 
productivity benefits of dividing a single task done by one 
person (such as making pins) into many smaller tasks done 
by different people (such as cutting the wires and 
sharpening the points).  Simon [40] talked about the virtues 
of decomposing a complex system into hierarchically 
nested, mostly independent, modules.  Lawrence and 
Lorsch [29] discussed the importance, in large 
organizations, of differentiation and integration, that is, 
dividing the organization into specialized subunits and then 
integrating these units to achieve the goals of the overall 
organization.  And a number of theorists have analyzed 
different kinds of coordination processes for decomposing 
tasks and for managing the interdependencies needed to 
integrate the subtasks [30,31,43,47]. 
Two of the most common approaches for dividing and 
combining subparts of complex human processes involve 
hierarchies and markets.  Most of us have daily experience 
of how managers in hierarchical organizations delegate 
subtasks to different people and then coordinate the 
combined efforts of these different people.  And a 
voluminous literature on organizational design analyzes 
different ways of doing these things (e.g. [17,29,34]).  
Markets also provide a way of coordinating the same kinds 
of activities that can be coordinated by hierarchies [12,47].  
For instance, when General Motors (GM) needs tires to put 
on its cars, one option it has is to manufacture the tires 
itself. In this case, GM would use its own internal hierarchy 
to coordinate aspects of the tire-making process such as the 
characteristics and delivery times of the tires.  But GM also 
has the option of buying the tires from an outside company, 
like Goodyear.  In this case, GM would outsource the tire-
making activities to Goodyear and coordinate these 
activities by negotiating with Goodyear about things like 
product characteristics, delivery times, and price.   
Of course, individual markets don’t exist in isolation; they 
are usually part of broader supply chains that assemble 
many levels of components, subcomponents, and raw 
materials into finished products.  For instance, GM may 
buy car seats from Johnson Controls and audio systems 
from Mitsubishi.  And Mitsubishi may, in turn, buy 
integrated circuits from Intel and plastic from DuPont.  In 
fact, the complex pattern of all these different tiers of 
suppliers is usually more accurately described as a “supply 
web” than as a simple, linear “supply chain” [10]. 
At each level of a supply web, different suppliers compete 
with other suppliers at the same level, but they cooperate 
with the buyers of their products and with the suppliers of 
their own subcomponents and raw materials.  And at each 
level, the suppliers of integrated products are responsible 
for making sure that the combination of subcomponents 
they assemble are compatible with each other and 
collectively sufficient to meet the customers’ needs.   
The presence of markets for all these subcomponents helps 
them find the pieces they need.  And—importantly—the 
fact that competitors at each level can simultaneously 
explore multiple combinations of subcomponents increases 
the chances that the system as a whole will find innovative 
new solutions and adapt to changing situations [6,46,51].    
CSCW tools for coordinating collective problem-solving 
A number of recent efforts in the CSCW community have 
focused on how to combine individual contributions to 
achieve larger goals.  For instance, several projects have 
emphasized developing automated tools to help manage 
global constraints that are specific to situations such as 
travel itinerary planning [50], conference scheduling [8,22], 
and taxonomy development [9].  Unlike these systems, the 
work we describe here relies primarily on humans to 
manage global constraints. Thus our approach is widely 
applicable, even in situations where there are no obvious 
ways of automating the management of these constraints. 
Another group of projects has focused on letting humans 
subdivide a large problem into subparts in a top-down, 
hierarchical manner [25,38].  Like our work, these systems 
are widely applicable, because they let humans combine 
subparts into solutions for the overall problems without 
relying on automated constraint management.  But these 
systems focus on exploring only one solution at a time, and 
they provide only limited support for reusing results from 
previous work.  Unlike these systems, our work encourages 
groups to make extensive reuse of previous work done by 
others and to simultaneously explore many different ways 
of combining partial solutions into solutions for the overall 
problem. 
Online contests as a tool for collective problem-solving 
There has also been a great deal of interest recently in using 
online contests as a tool for collective problem solving.  For 
example, different organizations have used various forms of 
contests for spurring innovation (e.g. InnoCentive, [2,13], 
OpenIDEO [27]), for developing software (e.g. TopCoder, 
[26]) and for writing encyclopedia articles (e.g. 
CrowdForge [24]).  Some previous research has focused on 
reusing ideas from contests like these to stimulate other 
ideas [7,48,49], but with few exceptions (e.g. [35]), this 
work has not focused—like ours does—on combining 
multiple previous ideas to create more complex solutions.     
Even though most people wouldn’t think of it this way, we 
can view a contest as a special kind of market.  The contest 
sponsor is the “buyer,” and the contestants are the potential 
“sellers.”  Just as sellers compete in a market to sell their 
products to buyers, contestants compete in a contest to have 
their entries selected by judges acting on behalf of the 
buyer.  The contest sponsor usually posts “prices” in 
advance (e.g., awards that the winning contestants will 
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receive), and the winning contestants usually “sell” to the 
contest sponsor some rights to use their contest entries.   
However, a single contest doesn’t provide any particular 
support for creating complex products.  If a group of people 
works together to create a complex entry, for instance, the 
contest structure itself doesn’t help them coordinate their 
work.  Instead, they need to recruit team members on their 
own and organize among themselves the combining of 
different pieces done by different team members.  
As we’ve seen above, however, the network of different 
markets in a supply web helps coordinate precisely these 
kinds of interactions for creating the various 
subcomponents of complex products. A key insight of this 
paper is that just as markets in a supply web can combine 
the results of other markets, so, too, contests in a contest 
web can combine the results of other contests. 
The hypothesis we explore in this paper, therefore, is that 
contest webs can help groups of people solve complex 
problems in many domains by simultaneously exploring 
many possible combinations of reusable subparts developed 
by themselves and others. 
WHAT IS A CONTEST WEB? 
We first define a contest family as a collection of different 
contests that, together, systematically cover different 
aspects of a complex problem.  Thus, a contest family is 
analogous to a collection of different markets for related 
products, such as all the markets for different kinds of auto 
parts.   
We next define an integrated contest as a contest in which 
the entries explicitly combine entries from other contests in 
the same contest family.  Thus an integrated contest is 
analogous to a market for complex products (like 
automobiles), which include parts (like tires and seats).  
Finally, we define a contest web as a contest family that 
includes one or more integrated contests.  Thus, a contest 
web is analogous to all the markets in the automotive 
industry, including both those for auto parts and for finished 
autos. In the following sections, we describe how we made 
the design choices needed to create a contest web called the 
MIT Climate CoLab. 
CLIMATE COLAB 
The MIT Climate CoLab platform allows people from all 
over the world to develop proposals for what we should do 
about climate change (Figure 1) [20,21,32,33]. The 
proposals can include any ideas users have for technical, 
economic, political, or other changes that should be made, 
as well as discussions of how the changes could be made, 
why they are feasible, and why they are desirable.  
The primary way of organizing activity in the CoLab has 
been through a collection of online contests.  In the first 
three years that the Climate CoLab site was publicly 
available (2009-2011), we created one or two contests per 
year with general topics like “What international climate 
agreements should the world community make?”  
Then, in 2013, we introduced the notion of contest families, 
and in each of the following years, we have had 17 or more 
contests per year on topics ranging from how to generate 
electricity with fewer emissions to how to adapt to sea level 
rise caused by climate change. 
 
Figure 1.  Climate CoLab home page.  Key parts of the system 
are accessible via the tabs at the top of the page for About, 
Contests, and Community. 
In each contest, after members submit proposals, expert 
judges we recruit first select semifinalists and give 
suggestions for improvements.  After the semifinalists 
revise their proposals, judges select the most promising 
entries to be finalists.  Then from the finalists, the judges 
select the Judges’ Choice Award winners and the 
community votes for the Popular Choice Award winners.   
The winners of these awards each year are also eligible for 
one overall Grand Prize (which in the past three years has 
been $10,000), and they have an opportunity to present 
their work to potential implementers and others in the 
annual Climate CoLab conferences.   
In 2015, we introduced integrated contests, thus making 
Climate CoLab a contest web.  As part of this change, we 
added another prize purse (currently $10,000) for 
contributions to integrated proposals (as described below).  
All prize money so far has come from our research funds. 
By the conclusion of the studies described here, more than 
400,000 people from virtually every country in the world 
had visited the Climate CoLab website, over 50,000 had 
registered as members of the community, and they had 
submitted nearly 1,500 proposals.  
The current operational system is publicly available at 
http://climatecolab.org, and its open-source software is at 
https://github.com/CCI-MIT/XCoLab. 
Climate CoLab proposals 
To create a proposal, authors fill in a template with fields 
such as a summary of the overall idea, descriptions of who 
would implement the idea, estimated costs, and expected 
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benefits (see Figure 2).  Each proposal also includes tabs 
for information such as estimated impacts on carbon 
emissions, authors of the proposal, and comments from 
community members.  Some proposals (like the one in 
Figure 2) include videos or other graphical illustrations. 
 
Figure 2.  Sample Climate CoLab proposal  
(Image courtesy of Eden Full) 
The sample proposal shown in Figure 2 won the Grand 
Prize in 2015.  It describes a device called SunSaluter, a 
rotating solar panel that uses dripping water and gravity to 
follow the sun across the sky while also filtering the water 
into clean drinking water.  
Other winning proposals have included (a) an approach for 
using aerial infrared photography superimposed on Google 
Maps to show people how much wasted heat is escaping 
from their homes in comparison to their neighbors, (b) an 
effort in China to develop and popularize an aspirational 
lifestyle for Chinese consumers, called the “China Dream,” 
that is more environmentally sustainable than the 
“American Dream,” and (c) a way for individual countries 
to charge emission levies for ocean shipments to and from 
their ports without violating international law, without 
providing significant economic incentives for shippers to 
avoid their ports, and without requiring global agreements. 
BREAKING THE PROBLEM INTO PIECES:  CONTEST 
FAMILIES 
A taxonomy of the problem 
To create contest families for the complex problem of what 
humans should do about climate change, we (as the contest 
organizers) first created a taxonomy of the different parts of 
the problem. While there is, in general, no single correct 
taxonomy for a given problem domain, we tried in our 
taxonomy to satisfy several desirable criteria: 
(a) The taxonomy as a whole should cover the space of 
possible solutions so that any plausible solution 
component should fit somewhere in the taxonomy. 
(b) In each dimension of the taxonomy, the categories 
should be mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive.  In other words, the categories in a 
dimension should not overlap each other and should 
collectively cover all possibilities for that dimension. 
(c) The taxonomy should reflect distinctions that experts in 
the area know are important. 
(d) The taxonomy should be simple and intuitive enough 
for the intended users to understand relatively easily.  
In our case, the intended users are a broad segment of 
the general population, not just climate change experts.  
For a more detailed description of the community 
membership, see [15]. 
Bearing these criteria in mind, we studied the literature on 
climate change (e.g. [42]) and worked with a number of 
experts in this domain to create a taxonomy for the climate 
change problem.  The taxonomy we created includes four 
dimensions phrased as questions:  What actions will be 
taken, Where will the actions be taken, Who will take the 
actions, and How will the actions be taken (see Figure 3).  
Each of these dimensions can be further broken down to 
arbitrarily detailed levels, and any action or contest related 
to climate change can be classified on one or more of these 
dimensions.  For instance, a contest about what physical 
actions electronics manufacturers in the US could take to 
reduce emissions from their factories would be classified 
under items 1.1.4, 2.2.1, 3.2, and 4.1 in Figure 3.   
Many other important problems (such as those involving 
economic inequality, education, and public health) can be 
characterized with a similar taxonomy.  The only dimension 
in our taxonomy that is specific to the climate change 
problem is the What dimension.  Other problems would 
have different values for the What dimension, but the 
Where, Who, and How dimensions are immediately 
applicable to a wide range of other problems.  
Mapping contests to the taxonomy 
Using this taxonomy as a guide, we created a set of contests 
that covered the space of possibilities on the What 
dimension.  In recent years, we did this using 
approximately the categories shown in Figure 3, item 1.  Of 
course, we could have done this using a different 
dimension, but we started with the What dimension since 
the categories in this dimension were especially important 
in the literature about climate change.   
In addition to these “coverage” contests, we also included a 
selection of more specialized contests focusing on specific 
questions that were either (a) particularly important parts of 
the overall problem or (b) of particular interest to our 
partner organizations.  For instance, many experts on 
climate change policy say that a critical leverage point in 
addressing climate change would be to have some kind of 
price on carbon emissions (e.g., a carbon tax).  For this 
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reason, we have had specialized contests on this topic in 
several years. 
 
Figure 3.  Partial view of the current Climate CoLab 
taxonomy  
To help Climate CoLab users see the relationships among 
the different contests and categories, the system provides an 
Outline View that shows which contests (from any year) are 
included in each category (see Figure 4).   
Alternative approaches to defining contest families 
In the Climate CoLab contests we have had so far, we as 
the contest organizers defined the contests in the contest 
family.  But there are other ways to do this.  For instance, 
one obvious possibility is to let the people who create 
proposals in integrated contests (called “integrated 
proposals”) also create their own sub-contests.  Then, other 
users could create proposals to fill specific needs that the 
integrated proposal creators identify themselves. This  
approach to problem decomposition would be similar to 
that used by, for example [25], [28], and [38]. 
A disadvantage of this approach, however, is that it would 
not encourage interchangeable sub-proposals. Sub-
proposals submitted into contests created by one integrated 
proposal creator would not, in general, be suitable for 
inclusion into other integrated proposals.  This approach, 
therefore, fails to take full advantage of the benefits of 
interchangeable parts that are often very important in real-
world supply webs [6,18].  
 
Figure 4.  The Outline View shows an expandable version of 
the contest taxonomy in the left column.  The right column 
shows all current (and/or previous) contests about the topic 
selected in the left column. 
To maximize these benefits, our experiments with Climate 
CoLab to date have used a set of pre-defined contests 
defined to provide an “architecture” for solving the problem 
[6].  This architecture is directly analogous to product 
architectures that are often very useful in real-world supply 
webs (such as the “Wintel” PC architecture based on the 
Windows operating system and Intel microprocessors) [6]. 
This increases the chances that the creators of different 
integrated proposals will be able to use various 
combinations of mostly interchangeable sub-proposals from 
other contests. 
PUTTING THE PIECES BACK TOGETHER:  
INTEGRATED CONTESTS  
Once a problem has been divided into different contests for 
different sub-parts of the problem, contest webs use 
integrated contests to create solutions for larger and larger 
parts of the whole problem.  This means that entries in an 
integrated contest should combine entries from other 
contests in ways that are (a) mutually compatible and (b) 
collectively sufficient.   
To be mutually compatible, the different parts of an 
integrated contest entry should not violate any important 
constraints.  For instance, if all the parts must be paid for 
from the same budget, then their total cost must not exceed 
the total budget.  Or if some parts require there to be a 
global carbon tax, and other parts require that there not be a 
global carbon tax, then the parts are not mutually 
compatible. 
To be collectively sufficient, the combination of all the parts 
must be enough to solve the problem to a satisfactory 
degree.  For instance, if the goal of a country’s climate plan 
1. What (actions will be taken) 
1.1. Reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
(Mitigation) 




1.1.5. Land use and other sectors 
1.2. Adapt to climate change (Adaptation) 
1.3. Reduce the warming effects of GHG 
emissions (Geoengineering) 






3. Who (will take the actions) 
3.1. Governments 
3.2. Businesses 
3.3. Other organizations 
3.4. Individual citizens and consumers 
4. How (will the actions be taken) 
4.1. Physical actions 
4.2. Political actions 
4.3. Economic actions 
4.4. Cultural actions 
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is to reduce emissions by 40%, but the combined emission 
reductions of all the sub-parts currently included will only 
reduce emissions by 10%, then the entry is not sufficient to 
solve the problem. 
Integrated contests in Climate CoLab  
In the most recent year (2015), we used two levels of 
integrated contests, defined on the Where dimension: 
a) One global contest for climate plans for the whole 
world, and 
b) Six regional contests for climate plans for the four 
largest emitting countries (US, Europe, China, 
India) and two other regions that include the rest 
of the world (Other Developed Countries and 
Other Developing Countries). 
In addition to these integrated contests, we also had 15 
basic contests on topics like energy supply, buildings, 
transportation, carbon price, and shifting attitudes and 
behavior.   
As suggested in Figure 5, proposals in regional contests 
could include any combination of proposals from the basic 
contests.  Proposals in the global contest were required to 
include one proposal from each of the regional contests, and 
they were also allowed to include additional proposals from 
the basic contests that applied across regions.  
The templates for integrated proposals include special fields 
where authors indicate which other proposals this one 
includes by adding links to those other proposals.  For 
instance, the template for global proposals includes a field 
for each region and tools to help users insert one regional 
proposal from the appropriate region into each field.  The 
templates also include places where authors describe how 
the different sub-proposals fit together and what their 
combined emission reductions are likely to be.  
As an example, the winner of the Judges’ Choice award in 
the 2015 Climate CoLab global contest was a proposal 
called “Solar Dollars.”  This proposal suggested how a 
digital currency (based on Bitcoin-like blockchain 
technology) could be used to incentivize emission 
reductions in countries around the world.  The global 
proposal contained sub-proposals for how each of the major 
countries and regions of the world could contribute to the 
overall plan.  The sub-proposal for Europe, for instance, 
described how Greece could be used as a test laboratory for 
renewable energy approaches that could be used all over 
Europe.  And this Europe sub-proposal, in turn, included 
further sub-proposals for things like using “green bond” 
crowdfunding to finance solar energy projects. 
Alternative approaches to integrated contests 
Defining integrated contests in different ways 
In the contests we have had so far, we defined integrated 
contests using the Where dimension (i.e., regional and 
global) because this dimension figures very prominently in 
many discussions of climate change.   
 
Figure 5. Elements of the Climate CoLab contest web. Boxes 
are contests. Circles are proposals.  Dotted borders indicate 
integrated contests and integrated proposals. Solid borders 
indicate basic contests and basic proposals. Lines indicate that 
the proposal at the top of the line includes the one at the 
bottom. The entire figure is a contest family. Since this contest 
family includes integrated contests, it is also a contest web.  
(See Appendix 1 for glossary of terms.) 
It would certainly be possible, however, to integrate along 
other dimensions.  For instance, it might well be desirable 
to have integrated contests for what governments, 
businesses, and other organizations could do.   
Automated tools to help create integrated proposals 
The current version of Climate CoLab relies primarily on 
human authors and judges to evaluate the mutual 
compatibility and collective sufficiency of the combinations 
of sub-proposals included in integrated proposals. However, 
we believe there are substantial opportunities to create 
automated tools to help in this process.  For example: 
(a) Identifying candidates for subcomponents.  To create a 
good integrated proposal, proposal authors may need to 
review many other proposals to find the best 
combination to include [36]. The Climate CoLab 
environment already provides some support for this 
process, such as simple keyword search, the Outline 
Viewer (Figure 4), and browse-by-contest.  We also 
believe there are many opportunities for future 
extensions of these tools [44], and as an example are 
developing a tool to show topically related proposals.   
(b) Constraint management. Another key challenge for 
proposal authors is making sure that the entries they 
combine are mutually compatible.  In our work so far, 
we have relied completely on the proposal authors to 
assess this (and on the contest judges to determine how 
well the authors did).  But we believe that, in many 
situations, it will be possible to have automated tools to 
help with this.  For instance, checking whether a budget 
constraint is satisfied could, in some situations, be as 
simple as adding up the costs of different sub-proposals.   
(c) Impact evaluation. Climate CoLab already uses built-in 
simulation models [20,21] to help proposal authors 
evaluate the overall impact of their proposals on 
emission reductions.  But using these models 












In some domains, it would be possible to have more 
detailed simulation models that could automatically 
calculate the impacts of various combinations of sub-
proposals. 
MOTIVATING ACTIVITY:  A VIRTUAL PRICE SYSTEM  
Incentive systems for integrated contests 
For people to participate in any activity, including online 
contests, they need to be motivated to do so [19].  The 
analogy with supply webs for physical products suggests an 
obvious possibility for one way of doing this:  The creators 
of integrated entries can “pay” the creators of the other 
entries they use.  This payment could be in an actual 
currency (like dollars), or it could take some other form 
such as points that people can accumulate and then receive 
recognition for accumulating large numbers of points.  
A key question for any such system is how to set the 
“prices” that integrated proposal creators pay. Whatever 
system is used should have at least the following desirable 
properties: 
a) Motivates people to spend more time working on 
the parts of the problem that are most important to 
solving the overall problem 
b) Does not provide strong incentives for gaming the 
system 
c) Is relatively simple to understand and administer 
d) Seems “fair” to participants 
e) Does not “waste” effort. 
In markets for physical products, the most common way of 
setting prices is to let buyers and sellers negotiate with each 
other in competitive markets.  This method often satisfies 
the desirable criteria above reasonably well [5]. 
But in many situations, including Climate CoLab, the 
resources being exchanged are not physical products; they 
are information products.  And information products, unlike 
physical ones, can often be used many times at virtually no 
additional cost.   
In such situations, we know from information economics 
that an optimal allocation of resources often results from 
compulsory licensing, that is, requiring the creators of 
information to make it available to anyone who wants to 
use it [4,19,37,39]. Without this, some products that could 
easily be reused won’t be and will thus be wasted.   
However, to motivate people to create information products 
in the first place, they need to be compensated for their 
efforts, so a compulsory licensing method also needs a way 
of requiring the user to pay the creator a “fair” price. 
Various methods for determining such prices have been 
proposed, including the rights of national governments in 
developing countries to use legislative or judicial means to 
enforce compulsory licensing on pharmaceuticals (e.g. 
[37]).   
The Climate CoLab Points System 
Bearing these considerations in mind, we designed an 
incentive system for the Climate CoLab integrated contests 
that is based on “CoLab Points.”  CoLab Points are roughly 
analogous to the money that is transferred among different 
participants in a physical supply web.  
Rather than requiring CoLab participants to negotiate with 
each other to determine how much an integrated proposal 
author needs to “pay” to incorporate a sub-proposal, we 
chose to use a form of compulsory licensing. This has the 
advantage of avoiding a potentially huge amount of 
negotiation among CoLab authors, some of whom might 
not even be available or willing to negotiate reasonably.  
This means that integrated proposal authors can use any 
combination of other proposals they want to without having 
to get permission from the authors of the other proposals.   
To set prices for this compulsory licensing system, we 
begin with the judges in the global contest who, we assume, 
represent the “end customers” of the whole problem-
solving system.  The judges essentially “buy” the proposals 
they think are best, and they “pay” for each proposal the 
price they think it is worth.  The points each global proposal 
receives are then distributed automatically to the authors of 
the global proposal and all the lower level proposals it 
contains.  The details of the method we used to do this in 
the 2015 Climate CoLab contests are described in Appendix 
2, but the basic ideas are as follows: 
(1) Using the supply web analogy, an integrated proposal 
team received “income” from selling their final 
proposal, and they had “expenses” for buying the other 
proposals they used.  The difference between these two 
amounts is, loosely speaking, their “profit.”  For each 
level of integrated proposals, the contest rules specified 
the expenses and the allocation of those expenses to 
other proposals. We based these rules on our subjective 
assessments of the amount of work required for each 
type of proposal and its importance for the overall 
problem. 
(2) At each level, the authors of a given proposal divided 
their profits among themselves in any way they agreed 
upon.  This is similar to how founders of a company 
agree among themselves how to allocate equity shares 
in the company, and this seems like a fair way to do 
this allocation. 
Together these incentives mean that:  
a) Integrated proposal authors are motived to help authors 
in other contests create good, mutually compatible 
proposals and to create such proposals themselves if no 
one else will. 
b) Basic proposal authors are motivated to create 
proposals that lots of higher-level proposal authors will 
want to use and to publicize their proposals to 
integrated proposal authors who can use them. 
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In other words, even though proposal authors in a single 
contest compete with each other, the CoLab Points system 
provides incentives for them to collaborate with authors in 
higher- and lower-level contests. 
Alternative ways of allocating points 
It is certainly possible that the subjectively determined 
method we used for allocating points could be improved, 
and we believe this is an important direction of future work. 
A recent economic result, however, gives some basis for 
believing that determining a satisfactory allocation method 
may be easier than one might assume. This result suggests 
that socially efficient outcomes can be achieved, even 
without optimal allocations, as long as the participants 
believe that the allocations are “fair enough” to motivate 
their efforts [11].   
EVALUATION AND OBSERVATIONS 
Contest families  
While it was not a primary hypothesis to be evaluated, we 
find it interesting that the creation of multiple contests in 
contest families may have been related to the number and 
quality of proposals we received.   While we don’t yet have 
enough data to definitively analyze the causal relationships 
statistically, our informal observation is that as we 
increased the number of contests in Climate CoLab over the 
years, the number, quality, and range of proposals 
submitted increased substantially.  For instance, Figure 6 
shows the close correspondence between the number of 
contests we had in each year and the number of proposals 
submitted in that year.   
 
Figure 6.  Number of contests and proposals by year 
Integrated contests  
As noted in the introduction, the two key questions we 
attempted to answer in this pilot study are: Would people 
simultaneously explore multiple combinations of 
interchangeable parts?  And would they actually reuse their 
own and others’ work? In this section, we first provide 
informal answers to these questions through visual 
inspection of the structural relationships among proposals.  
Then we analyze these relationships more formally using 
statistical tests.    
Visual inspection of structural relationships 
Figure 7 shows the relationships among the integrated 
proposals actually created in the 2015 Climate CoLab 
contests.  Several aspects of this diagram are worth noting.  
First, it is clear from inspection of Figure 7 that proposal 
authors did explore multiple combinations of 
interchangeable parts.  The global proposals (top row) 
include different combinations of regional proposals 
(middle rows), which in turn, include different 
combinations of basic proposals (bottom rows).  In 
addition, as we anticipated, some global proposals also 
include direct links to basic proposals.  And the 
interchangeability of these proposals is indicated by the fact 
that many lower level proposals are reused multiple times 
in different higher-level proposals.   
It is also clear that proposal authors reuse work from 
themselves and others.  For instance, the team represented 
by medium blue circles created the global proposal shown 
at the far left of the top row.  This global proposal included 
regional proposals created by others and a basic proposal 
they created themselves.  The regional proposals in this 
global proposal, in turn, included multiple basic proposals 
created by different author teams. 
 
Figure 7. Relationships among proposals in the 2015 contests.  
Each circle represents a proposal.   Lines indicate that the 
proposal above includes the one below.  Different colors 
represent different author teams.  White circles represent 
author teams with no other proposals in the diagram. 
Do authors simultaneously explore multiple combinations of 
interchangeable parts? 
To analyze more formally whether authors simultaneously 
explore multiple combinations of interchangeable parts, we 
use statistical tests to answer two questions. 
First, we ask:  Do authors reuse individual subparts in 
multiple places? In a system with non-interchangeable 
parts, each sub-proposal would be used in at most one 
higher-level proposal.  But as Table 1 shows, 40% of the 
proposals that are used in any integrated proposal are used 
in more than one.  Using Fisher’s exact test to compare our 
empirical distribution to a null hypothesis where all 191 










































proposal, we reject the null hypothesis (p<<0.001).  Thus 
our empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that 






proposals Total % 
1 91 23 114 60% 
2 24 19 43 22% 
3 1 9 10 5% 
≥ 4 14 10 24 13% 
Total 130 61 191 100% 
Table 1.  Number of times basic and regional proposals are 
used in higher-level integrated proposals. 
Second, we ask:  Do authors reuse individual subparts in 
multiple combinations?  In a system where multiple 
combinations of subparts were not being explored, each 
subpart would always be used with the same other subparts.  
But as Table 2 shows, when a pair of proposals is used 
together in one higher-level proposal, the probability that if 
one of them is reused elsewhere, the other will be, too, is 
only 38%.  Using Fisher’s exact test to compare this to a 
null hypothesis that they are always reused together, we 
reject the null hypothesis (p<<0.001).  Thus our empirical 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that many 
different combinations are being explored. 





proposals Total % 
With other 
proposal 
306 37 343 38% 
Without other 
proposal 
91 467 558 62% 
Total 397 504 901 100% 
Table 2.  Number of times a member of a pair of proposals 
that is used together once is reused with or without the other 
in regional and global proposals. 
Do authors reuse both their own and others’ work? 
If the authors of integrated proposals only wanted to use 
their own work (for instance, because they didn’t trust the 
quality of anyone else’s work), then all integrated proposals 
would include only sub-proposals by author teams with 
membership that overlapped the team creating the 
integrated proposal.  Conversely, if authors didn’t realize 
that they could use sub-proposals they created themselves, 
then all integrated proposals would include only work by 
others.  However, as Table 3 shows, of the 348 uses of 
proposals at higher levels, 28% were uses of their own 
work, and 72% were uses of work by non-overlapping 
author teams.  Using Fisher’s exact test to compare this 
empirical data to null hypotheses assuming that authors 
never use their own work or always use their own work, we 
reject both null hypotheses (p<<0.001 in both cases). Thus 
our empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that 
integrated proposal authors reuse both their own and others’ 
work.  




proposals Total % 
Own work 54 42 96 28% 
Others’ work 159 93 252 72% 
Total 213 135 348 100% 
Table 3.  Number of times integrated proposal author teams 
use basic or regional sub-proposals that are their own work 
(author teams with overlapping members) or others’ work 
(author teams with no overlapping members). 
CoLab Points System 
We do not separately evaluate the effectiveness of the 
CoLab Points system, but we find it interesting to observe 
the distribution of CoLab Points that resulted from the point 
system (Figure 8).  A total of 226 community members 
received CoLab Points, and the figure shows the 
distribution of these points among the 89 members who 
received 7 or more points.  (The remaining 137 users 
would, if shown, appear as a very long tail to the right of 
the graph.)  It is intriguing that this curve resembles scale-
free distributions, which appear frequently in systems 
where “the rich get richer” such as income distributions, 
city sizes, and word frequencies [1,16].  Statistical tests [3] 
show that a power law fits our data significantly better than 
an exponential distribution (p<<0.001) and not significantly 
differently from a lognormal distribution (p>0.05.) 
 
Figure 8.  Distribution of CoLab Points among proposal 
authors in the 2015 Climate CoLab contests.  
Overall quality of proposals 
During the judging process, expert judges rated proposals 
on several dimensions (Appendix 3), and these ratings 
provide a rough way of gauging the quality of the 
proposals.  As Table 4 shows, the averages of these ratings 
for the finalist integrated proposals are not significantly 
different from basic proposals (except for the presentation 
dimension where they are somewhat worse).  This result is 
reassuring because it shows that our first major test of 
integrated proposals led to proposals that were judged 
roughly equivalent in quality to basic proposals like those 













But it is important not to over-interpret this comparison 
because these two kinds of proposals are not directly 
comparable to each other, any more than complete cars are 
directly comparable to car batteries.  Complete cars can do 
many things their batteries alone cannot, and people 
judging their quality presumably take into account different 
factors in the two cases.  In the same way, integrated 
proposals have greater scope and are presumably judged by 
different standards than the basic proposals they contain. 
As a rough indication of the overall quality of both kinds of 
proposals, we can round the judges’ average ratings to the 
nearest whole number.  For all the dimensions rated, this 
results in 3’s on a scale from 1 to 4.  According to the 
scales used, therefore, these ratings indicated proposals that 
were interesting and imaginative, with acceptable 
feasibility, moderate impact, and two of the following three 
presentation characteristics: clear, persuasive, and 
appealing. Even though this is not a rigorous evaluation 
relative to a clear external standard, it is at least a rough 
indication that the proposals are solid and worthwhile but 





Novelty 2.7 2.8 
Feasibility 3.0 2.6 
Impact 3.0 2.7 
Presentation 3.1 2.6* 
Average 2.9 2.7 
(No. of observations) 63 8 
Table 4.  Quality of finalist proposals in basic and integrated 
contests as rated by judges. (* p < .05)  
DISCUSSION 
When we first described the idea of combining ideas in 
integrated contests, many people were very skeptical that it 
could work.  They asked questions like:  Could a large, 
diverse crowd even understand the basic concepts of the 
approach well enough to create integrated proposals with 
the multi-layered structure we intended? Would people be 
able to simultaneously explore multiple ways of doing this? 
Would the creators of integrated proposals be able to find 
enough other proposals to include in theirs?  And would 
people be motivated enough to spend time combining other 
people’s ideas instead of just developing their own?   
We believe one of the most important results of the pilot 
testing described here is to answer all these questions in the 
affirmative.  We showed that it was possible for a diverse 
crowd of people from all over the world to simultaneously 
create multiple, sensible integrated proposals using a 
combination of their own and other’s work. 
What is needed to use a contest web in a new domain? 
To create a contest web in a new domain, one needs to do 
the following: 
(1) Identify an overall problem complex enough for 
different people to work on different parts. 
(2) Create one or more basic contests, each for a different 
part of the overall problem. 
(3) Create one or more integrated contests that combine 
entries from other contests.  Generally, one of these 
integrated contests will be for solutions to the overall 
problem, and there may be others for solutions to 
various levels of subparts. 
(4) Identify incentives that will be sufficient to motivate 
people to participate effectively.  One promising 
component of such incentives is a point system (like 
CoLab Points). 
The open source software platform we developed to support 
these things for Climate CoLab is called XCoLab and is 
designed to be easily customizable for other problem 
domains.  The main changes needed to use the system in a 
new problem area are adding new content (e.g., a new set of 
basic and integrated contests).  In some cases, it may also 
be appropriate to add new modeling or constraint 
management tools.   
Using this approach, we have recently launched several 
new sites for other problem domains.  For instance, 
working with the MIT Solve initiative, we have developed a 
site for tackling other societal problems such as education, 
and healthcare (http://solvecolab.mit.edu).  And we believe 
a similar approach can be used to address problems inside 
individual organizations such as strategic planning and 
product design.  
When are contest webs desirable? 
There are a number of situations where the contest web 
approach may be particularly useful relative to previous 
CSCW approaches.  For instance, as noted above [6,46,51], 
simultaneously exploring multiple combinations of reusable 
parts can substantially increase the likelihood of innovation 
and rapid adaptation relative to purely top-down 
approaches [25,38].  In contrast, most previous CSCW 
examples, including both top-down hierarchies and 
communities like Wikipedia, explore only one solution 
alternative at a time.   
By exploring many alternatives in parallel, while still 
reusing previous work as much as possible, the contest web 
approach may be especially useful for problems that are 
very important (where extensive effort is justified), very 
urgent (where parallel efforts may be critical), and/or very 
controversial (where working in a single group may be 
difficult). Finally, the contest web approach can be used 
even in situations where domain-specific automated tools 
(e.g., [8,9,22,50]) are not available. 
Competition and cooperation 
Another intriguing aspect of contest webs is how they 
integrate cooperation and competition in the same 
environment.  For instance, the Popular Choice global 
winner in the 2015 global contest began with a US regional 
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proposal by a user whose user profile described her as a 
“biocentric stay-at-home mom.”  After posting her original 
proposal, authors of several other proposals contacted her, 
and they agreed to cooperate on a global proposal that 
eventually included over 25 authors. Even though many 
members of this team did not know each other before 
“meeting” on the Climate CoLab site and some had 
competing proposals, many of them are now actively 
working together to raise money for the ideas in their 
proposals. 
Limitations  
The current study demonstrates that teams were able to 
create proposals of reasonable quality with the desirable 
structural characteristics we intended, but we believe more 
systematic measurement of proposal quality is highly 
desirable.  We also believe that substantial improvements in 
quality are possible.  To increase the quality of the best 
proposals in future contests, we hope to explore 
possibilities such as:  more explanatory material on the site 
about creating integrated proposals, more recruiting of 
people likely to create good proposals, stronger incentives, 
and tools that make it easier for people to find and integrate 
other proposals. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper describes a way of using online contest webs to 
divide and combine different parts of a complex problem.  
Drawing on an analogy with how multiple suppliers create 
complex physical products, this method shows how 
members of an online community can create complex 
knowledge artifacts that represent the solutions to complex 
problems.  The method (a) combines solutions to sub-parts 
of the problem at multiple levels of aggregation, (b) 
encourages widespread knowledge sharing and reuse, and 
(c) provides incentives for knowledge creation based on 
how useful the knowledge is to others. 
We believe the results of our early testing of this method 
demonstrate that the method can work effectively in a 
large-scale community that is addressing a complex 
problem, and we believe the approach can be applied much 
more widely for many other kinds of problems.   
In the long run, we hope this new approach will provide one 
more powerful tool in the world’s design toolkit for solving 
important societal and organizational problems. 
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APPENDIX 1:  GLOSSARY  
Proposal – an entry submitted in a contest (e.g., Climate 
CoLab proposals contain proposed solutions to various 
aspects of the problem of what to do about climate change). 
Contest – a collection of proposals on the same topic from 
which judges select finalists and winners. 
Contest family – a collection of related contests that, 
together, systematically cover different aspects of a 
complex problem. 
Integrated proposal – a proposal that explicitly combines 
(by reference) proposals from other contests in the same 
contest family. 
Integrated contest - a contest in which the entries are 
integrated proposals. 
Contest web – a contest family that includes one or more 
integrated contests. 
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APPENDIX 2: POINT ALLOCATION METHOD 
In the 2015 Climate CoLab global contest, the judges had a 
total of 10,000 CoLab Points to allocate, and they divided 
these points as shown in Table 5.  These points were then 
divided among all the people who contributed to the global 
proposals as summarized in Table 6. 
Place 1st 2nd 3rd (tie) 5th Total 
Points 6,000 1,833 1,000 (each) 167 10,000 
Table 5.  Judges’ allocation of points among winning global 
proposals. 
How were points divided among the authors of integrated 
proposals and the proposals they contained? 
For the 2015 contests, we determined the point allocation 
for integrated proposal authors based on our subjective 
assessments of the amount of work required for the 
different levels of proposals.  Since regional proposal 
authors may have needed to review and incorporate dozens 
of basic proposals from many different areas, while global 
proposal authors only needed to review and select from 
among proposals in the six regional categories, we 
estimated that the regional authors had to do roughly twice 
as much work as the global authors.   
In both cases, we also estimated that most of the important 
work was being done by the many authors who created the 
sub-proposals that were included in these integrated 
proposals.  These assessments led us to the allocations of 
5% and 10%, respectively, as the “profits” received by the 
global and regional author teams.    
The authors of basic proposals, of course, received as profit 
all the points their proposals received, since they had no 
other expenses.  
How were points allocated among the different proposals 
included in an integrated proposal? 
At the global level, we assumed that it was most important 
to have good regional plans for the regions that would 
otherwise account for the most emissions.  To estimate this, 
we used projections of the “business as usual” scenarios for 
the different regions in 2050 (the end of the planning period 
we considered) [45].     
At the regional level, we assumed that, if we asked the 
regional proposal authors to estimate how important the 
different proposals they used were, there would be strong 
temptations to game the system.  So, instead, we used the 
straightforward approach of simply dividing a regional 
proposal’s expenses equally among all the proposals it 
used.  While this is certainly an approximation, we felt that 
this simple method was a reasonable approach with which 
to start.  
APPENDIX 3:  PROPOSAL RATING SCALE  
Novelty:  The degree to which the proposal is original (not 
only rare but also ingenious, imaginative, or surprising), 
and modifies a paradigm. 
1 = Common, mundane, boring 
2 = Interesting, but not unheard of 
3 = Unusual, interesting; imaginative 
4 = Rare; surprising; challenges paradigms 
Feasibility:  The degree to which the proposal is appealing 
(socially, legally and politically) and implementable 
(technically and economically) 
1 = Infeasible socially, politically, legally, or technically 
2 = Challenging; feasibility is questionable 
3 = Acceptable; Objections & barriers partially addressed 
4 = Appealing; Potential objections & barriers well 
addressed 
Impact:  The degree to which the proposal, if successfully 
implemented, will be effective at solving the challenge in 
the contest prompt 
1 = Benefits/impact not clear 
2 = Limited benefits/small impact 
3 = Partial solution/moderate impact 
4 = Large, direct, & positive impact 
Presentation:  The degree to which the proposal is 
presented in a clear, persuasive and appealing manner 
1 = Neither clear, persuasive, nor appealing 
2 = 1 of 3: Clear, Persuasive, Appealing 
3 = 2 of 3: Clear, Persuasive, Appealing 
4 = 3 of 3: Clear, Persuasive, Appealing 
 
Level 
% of points 
to proposal 
creators 
How are points 
allocated among 
proposal creators? 
% of points 
to included 
proposals 
How are points allocated among  
included proposals? 
Global 5% Mutual agreement 95% Proportional to projected emissions for each region under “business as usual” in 2050 
Regional 10% “ 90% Divided equally among all proposals included 
Basic 100% “ 0% Not applicable 
Table 6.  Method for allocating points from integrated proposals in the 2015 Climate CoLab contests
 
